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Marine Policy
Good fences do make good neighbors around where Robert Frost
lived and anyplace else where broken bars or slack wire can mean hours
of trouble rounding up strays. But what about the web of sea boundaries
nations are claiming for themselves or for a "common heritage"? Can one
set metes and bounds for the ocean, "which rather possesses the earth than
is by it possessed/' to quote from our lead article? More precisely, can this
be done in a manner fair to rich and poor, coastal and landlocked,
commerce, industry, science?
These issues will surface time and again as governments meet
in conference or confrontation to reshape the law of the sea and as private
citizens attempt to comply with the new agreements. In both arenas, there
will be a need for men and women trained as few have been trained before
to bring pure and applied research, physical and social science, to the conduct
of marine affairs. The Institution, through its Marine Policy and Ocean
Management Program, is helping to develop such expertise. The articles
in this issue, all written by participants in the program, give a flavor of
the scope, the complexity and the importance of marine policy.
William H. MacLeish
Editor
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Freshly dredged manganese nodules
Who owns the oceans? Despite the
international attention it is currently receiving,
the question is an old one. Pope Alexander VI
provided one of the first formal answers in 1493
by dividing the oceans between Spain and
Portugal, the major sea powers of the day.
That
"right" lasted as long as did the might
to enforce it until the British and bad weather
defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588.
Before Alexander, and after him, there
were innumerable customs and covenants
concerning this bay and that strait and the
people who sailed them. But there was no
commonly accepted thought regarding ocean
ownership until the writings of Hugo Grotius,
a seventeenth-century Dutch jurist and statesman,
began to gain favor among maritime nations.
The ocean, wrote Grotius in 1609, "which rather
possesses the earth than is by it possessed . . .
cannot become private property. Hence it follows,
to speak strictly, that no part of the sea can be
considered as the territory of any people
whatsoever". Grotius' "Freedom of the Seas"
TeniK'co, Inc.
came to be regarded as freedom of the high seas;
coastal nations claimed sovereignty over coastal
zones, or territorial seas generally, out to the
distance of three miles effective cannon range
at the time. Seaward of this zone, free and
unimpeded passage was permitted.
The width of the territorial sea has
never been fixed by international agreement,
and the temptation to extend claims farther out
on the continental shelves has proven irresistible.
In recent decades, a 12-mile zone has become
popular, particularly as regards fisheries resources
(see diagram). In 1945, President Truman
announced that the United States was assuming
jurisdiction over the seabed of its continental
shelves and their resources out to a depth of 200
meters (though not over superjacent waters
beyond three miles from shore). In 1952, Peru,
Chile, and Ecuador went much further in
claiming control over the sea floor, fisheries,
and surface waters out to a distance of 200 miles.
In 1958, an international conference on the
continental shelf produced a convention to
TV camera and tripod locate nodules on the bottom
which some 47 countries are now party-
containing what has become a controversial
clause: a coastal state was to have jurisdiction
over the seabed out to the 200-meter isobath,
or, "beyond that limit to where the depth of the
superjacent waters admits to the exploitation of
the said area." In layman's terms, if one has
the technology to obtain bottom resources lying
off one's coasts at depths greater than 200 meters,
one is free to take them.
Within the last few years many
countries, especially developing ones (see page
6), have come to look beyond their coasts for
sources of wealth and power and to argue for
territorial seas of up to 200 miles in width.
There are several reasons for these views, certainly
among the foremost the belief that the oceans
contain a vast supply of mineral and biologic
resources waiting to be harvested. Many of these
same countries also feel that resources outside
the 200-mile zone should belong to everyone as
the common heritage of mankind. Other nations,
including many who are landlocked or
shelf-locked, fear that they will not receive their
"fair share" of ocean resources. They support
the view that the common heritage principle
should apply to all areas outside a narrow (12
miles or so) territorial sea. There a number of
other complex and delicate tensions surrounding
oceanic claims, some of which hopefully will be
eased by the 1974 Conference on the Law of the
Sea, scheduled for Santiago, Chile. Certainly,
though, many countries and interest groups will
be unhappy with the results. Oceanographers
and oceanographic research may suffer
considerably if restrictive, 200-mile-wide
territorial sea regimes are adopted (see page 18).
Oil-importing nations and other similarly
vulnerable states will be adversely affected if
transit through a few straits is curtailed (see
page 14).
It was precisely to discourage general
adoption of sweeping territorial sea claims that
the United States in 1970 suggested that the
zone beyond the 200-meter isobath and outward
to a depth or distance to be established be
considered a
"trusteeship zone". Within the
zone, the contiguous state would not have a
sovereign claim but would act as trustee for the
international community by issuing leases
and the like for the control or exploitation
of resources. In effect, the trustee, though it
would not own these resources, could act to
regulate them.
But how bountiful are marine resources?
How does their distribution fit in with current
schemes and regimes for the division of
oceans? The biological resources, such as fish,
shrimp, seaweed, clams and lobsters, are
rich indeed. Most, however, are caught
within the nearshore areas, and only a fairly
small percentage occurs in the deep sea or
outside the 200-mile zone. Thus, the "common
heritage of mankind" would not gain much
from the biological resources if a 200-mile
territorial sea were adapted. However, this
has long been known, and those proposing
the common heritage have felt that the mineral
rather than living resources would supply the
great future wealth. But here also much of the
known resources occurs in relatively shallow
waters. Sand and gravel are found mainly in
the nearshore part of the shelf. The costs of
recovering and transporting this resource
from depths over anything more than a few
fathoms are prohibitive. Marine oil and gas,
at least in the near term, will be taken from
the continental shelf where thick sedimentary
sequences and the structure necessary for oil
and gas accumulation are found (see Oceanus,
Spring 1973). It is not anticipated that
significant oil and gas resources occur on the
continental slope, although some potential may
exist for the deeper continental rise (usually
2,000 or more meters in depth). However, the
technology and high cost associated with
drilling on the continental rise make exploitation
improbable within the next decade or two, or
perhaps ever. Thus, if territorial seas are to be
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extended to 200 nautical miles, the international
community would gain little in the way of
conventional energy resources.
There are really only three deep-sea
mineral resources that stand any reasonable
chance of being exploited in -the near future.
These are heavy, metal-rich muds, such as those
from the Red Sea, phosphorite, and manganese
nodules. The Red Sea muds (see Oceanus,
June 1967) contain large and valuable amounts
of copper, lead, and zinc, but the recovery
and refining problems associated with this
deposit may prohibit its exploitation. In any
case, this deposit, which lies essentially midway
between Saudi Arabia and Sudan in what
lawyers refer to as an inland sea, would belong
to these two countries, according to some
mutually agreeable formula, regardless of any
outcome of the Law of the Sea Conference.
No other known metal-rich muds have metal
concentrations high enough to warrant their
recovery as an ore at present.
Phosphorite generally is found on
shallow banks and areas isolated from a large
supply of sediment. Deposits found on the
sea floor are apt to be lower in grade than those
that can be more easily mined on land. In
addition, land resources are probably sufficient
to meet demand for several hundreds of years.
The one remaining potential resource
is manganese nodules. Though early estimates
of the nodules' commercial value have been
questioned, recent studies have delineated some
areas in the Pacific containing nodules assaying
at 1.5% copper, and 1.8% nickel. These values
are respectable and could be sufficient to pay
for harvesting and refining the nodules. Indeed,
several companies, including Hughes and
Tenneco, already have made significant
investments in preparation for nodule "mining".
But even so, the size of this resource is
insignificant when considered in terms of the
common heritage of mankind. K. O. Emery,
P. M. Fye, and George Cadwalader* note that
the total annual value of copper, nickel,
manganese, and cobalt production (significant
amounts of these latter two elements could be
recovered from manganese nodules) is less than
$6 billion. Assuming optimistically that 10%
of this market could come from the sea and
that 10% of that output could be taxed by an
international authority, less than $60,000,000
would be realized. Ironically, most of the metals
are now produced by developing countries, which
thus would suffer from a successful marimining
venture.
Based on what we know about the
mineral resources of the sea floor, most of the
valuable deposits are on continental shelves
already under the control of the coastal states.
If a 200-mile territorial sea is adopted, little will
be left to comprise the common heritage. If the
countries of the world are really anxious to share
the resources of the oceans, they might begin by
considering the sharing of those resources within
200 nautical miles off their coast rather than
jealously guarding them and graciously giving up
the little that remains. Future generations may
discover other deep-ocean resources that make
the common heritage a viable concept, but
for the moment it is no more than an empty
phrase.
Dr. David A. Ross is an Associate
Scientist in the Department of Geology and
Geophysics at the Institution. He has been
scientific coordinator of the Marine Policy and
Ocean Management Program.
*
K. O. Emery, P. M. Fye and George
Cadwalader, "Public Policy Towards the Environment,
1973: A Review and Appraisal", Annals of the New
York Academy of Sciences, 2973, VoL 216, pp. 51-55.
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In December, 1972, the General
Assembly of the United Nations decided to
convene the third Law of the Sea Conference
(LOS). The Conference is scheduled initially
in two sessions. It will open in New York in
the fall of 1973 with a discussion of mainly
procedural and organizational matters.
Substantive issues will be taken up some months
later in Santiago, Chile.
The decision to convene the third LOS
Conference* came after a prolonged consideration
of issues relating to the law of the sea by the
United Nations over a period of six years.
During this period, discussions ranged from a
mere exchange of information to hard negotiation
of national interests. What began as a modest
enterprise to modify the law of the sea soon led
to extensive questioning of the very foundations
of the public order of the oceans.
* The first conference was held in 1958,
the second in 1960, both in Geneva.
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The third LOS Conference now has
a mandate not only to modify the existing law
of the sea but to change it radically, if that
can be accomplished within the contemporary
political framework. The conference will be
attended by more than 130 independent,
sovereign states. Importantly, the developing
countries, scarcely a force in previous marine
conferences, will constitute a predominant
majority among participants at New York
and Santiago.
There is no commonly held criterion
to identify a developing country. However, all
countries in Africa except South Africa and
Rhodesia; all countries in Asia except Japan;
all countries in the American continents except
the United States and Canada all these plus
Fiji, Malta, and Cyprus are generally so defined.
The per capita income of these nations is low,
ranging from $50 to more than $300. But
differences far exceed similarities when one
examines cultural traditions, ideological
affiliations, forms of government, and levels
of national intellectual and technical resources.
In the majority or not, the developing
nations will come to the conference with serious
weaknesses. These include: a lack of firsthand
knowledge about offshore geography and
resource potential and of expertise in the
employment of that knowledge; poor coordination
in the projection of coherent national ocean
policies,- and shortages of financial resources
to represent themselves adequately at the
numerous negotiating forums. Despite these
disadvantages, they have managed to articulate
their interests and helped to forge strong
interest groups.
On almost every aspect of the different
arguments which will be examined, there is
no monolithic "developing country" position,
just as there is no "developed country" position.
In the context of ocean policy formulation, it is
more appropriate to categorize nations in
terms of landlocked, shelf-locked (those with
offshore areas whose depth never exceeds
200 meters) and other coastal states; distant-water
and coastal-fishing nations; major or minor
maritime powers; major or minor energy
consumers; or supporters or opponents of open
access for scientific research at sea.
Landlocked countries, with no direct
access to the sea, tend to be opposed to extensions
of coastal state jurisdiction. Rather, they favor
enlargement of the maritime area, whose
benefits can be shared equitably by all states.
Shelf-locked states are inclined toward limiting
coastal state jurisdiction to modest depths. Both
groups of countries have opted for comprehensive
international machinery to administer the
resources of the high seas.
Other coastal states, on the other hand,
would gain almost all the economically attractive
Dr. Rao holds a doctorate in law from
Yale. He is currently completing a book on the
legal regime of the non-living resources of the
sea.
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oil, gas, and hard-mineral resources off their
coasts by claiming extension of their jurisdiction
to a depth of up to 2,500 meters. Similarly,
these countries can gain exclusive control of
major fisheries by extending their jurisdictional
claims to 200 miles. It is with this in mind
that some African, Caribbean and South
American states have proposed the so-called
"economic zone" and "patrimonial sea"
concepts, which would legitimize such control.
Under present international law, several
countries fish all around the world beyond the
12-mile offshore zone. These high-seas fishermen
(including the Soviet Union, Japan, U.K., France,
West Germany) are known as distant-water
fishing nations. Clearly, their activities would
suffer in the event the "economic zone" or
"patrimonial sea" concept were to be adopted.
Thus, while it is in the interest of some coastal
nations to extend their oceanic claims, those
with long-distance fleets to consider will oppose
such a move.
According to one expert estimate,
if claims are extended for whatever reason
much beyond the present customary limit of
12 miles, at least 116 straits now open to free
transit will come under coastal state jurisdiction.
These include Malacca, Gibraltar, and Bab al
Mandab (at the southern end of the Red Sea).
Obviously, such a situation would affect the
interests of several maritime powers, and it is
understandable that they should be in the
forefront of strategies to insure maintenance of
the right of free transit. They are joined by
nations such as Japan, which depend on large
supplies of imported gas and oil and are thus
anxious to avoid unreasonable coastal state
regulations on maritime transport involving
supertankers. On the other hand, Indonesia,
Spain, Turkey, Yemen and other countries
bordering many of the straits in question are
afraid that unregulated foreign passage through
their territorial seas will result in hazardous
pollution and threatening military activities
close to their coasts.
In an attempt to broaden the base of
agreement among themselves, some developing
United Nations
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countries, particularly those espousing the
"patrimonial sea" and "economic zone"
concepts, often do not differentiate among
marine uses they seek to regulate. Thus,
fishery resources are often lumped in with energy
and mineral resources. By opting for common
boundaries and common institutions for both
living and nonliving resources, governments
are apt to ignore differences in the location
of these resources as well as factors affecting
their renewability and incentives necessary
to optimize their exploitation.
Further, many developing coastal
nations advocate what appear to be contradictory
positions. They support an exclusive coastal
state jurisdiction over nonliving resources up
to the edge of the continental margin, or up to a
depth of nearly 2,500 meters, and over living
resources within 200 miles of the coast. At
the same time, they insist on the creation of
comprehensive international machinery to
govern resources of the maritime areas beyond
such limits. According to available information,
there are hardly any economically attractive
nonliving resources beyond a depth of 3,000
meters except for manganese nodules, whose
value, at the moment, is still in doubt. So
also, beyond a distance of 200 miles, the
potential for fishery resources is rather minimal
compared to what it is within 200 miles. Under
the circumstances, insistance on comprehensive
international machinery for such deep and
distant ocean areas reflects either naivety or a
diplomatic ploy to placate landlocked and
shelf-locked countries.
It is unfortunate that the developing
countries as a group do not show determination
to fight for truly effective international
machinery to regulate exploitation of ocean
resources. A few of them even doubt the
relevance of international organizations to
their national well-being. In defending their
extensive claims over maritime resources, the
representatives of these countries point out that
it is realistic to defend one's own interests.
The hard reality is that the developing
countries have consistently benefited from
international institutions. They themselves
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endorse this fact by demanding more economic
aid and technological transfer through
multilateral organizations than through
bilateral processes. Under bilateral conditions,
the developing countries must often contend
with participants who bargain from a position
of strength. Further, it is clear that the
international institutions have provided a forum
for the developing countries to unite among
themselves and to press their cases from a
stronger moral and political base. Indeed if
these international institutions did not exist,
the developing countries would have found it
necessary to create them, if only to insulate
themselves against the harsh facts of bilateral
dealings in a world of striking inequalities.
Some of the coastal developing countries
have not yet considered alternatives in the
evert the maritime areas to which they intend
to lay claim yield little or no economically
attractive resources. Many have not faced the
realities assuming resources turn out to be
plentiful of competing in world markets,
negotiating with well-equipped, profit-oriented
private business associations, or raising capital
and developing the infrastructure basic to
successful resource exploitation.
The "patrimonial sea" and "economic
zone" concepts face opposition from the
landlocked and shelf-locked developing
countries, who seem equally determined to
preserve and enhance their own share of ocean
wealth. They are also opposed by strong
developed nations who regard a continued
share in the high-sea fisheries as absolutely
vital to their economy. If the case for extensive
jurisdiction is pressed too hard, with no efforts
to accommodate others whose concern for
personal well-being is just as strong, a
breakdown of the third LOS Conference is
likely. Such a situation would indeed be a
tragedy and an anticlimax to a very hard and
long negotiating process. In its aftermath of
"everyone for himself," it is the developing
countries which will be at a severe disadvantage.
The most promising path toward progress
under the circumstances is to limit coastal states'
. . . and in Martinique
MARINE AREAS CLAIMED UNDER DIFFERENT REGIMES
Outer Limit
exclusive maritime area to a reasonable degree,
perhaps 1,000 meters or 100 miles, in order to
bring marine resources under international
regulation in sufficient amounts to make
such regulation feasible. An arrangement of
this sort would prove to be an insurance against
total disappointment for certain coastal states
which for one reason or the other find themselves
unable to gain any personal profit from their
maritime areas. It would provide a realistic
way of accommodating the interests of other
geographically disadvantaged states. And it
would encourage the work of institutions of
inclusive authority and common sharing, the
only bodies which can fully appreciate and
cope with the intricacies of an increasingly
interdependent world.
The third LOS Conference should
quickly decide on limits for the exclusive
coastal state maritime resource jurisdiction.
Further, it should lay down specific policies to
regulate ocean resources beyond the limits of
national jurisdiction. It should also come to
grips with the precise structure of international
machinery.
In the case of the living resources of
the seas, it appears appropriate to rely on regional
bodies to implement rather broadly conceived
international policies which can take advantage
of the existing fisheries bodies and commissions.
On the other hand, a rather centralized procedure
for organizing the exploitation of nonliving
resources is desirable. Such a mechanism is
necessary to develop limited and vital resources
on a cooperative rather than competitive basis,
keeping global energy needs and demands in
perspective. As for navigation, inclusive access
with minimum necessary regulations will best
promote greater flow of international trade.
By working for these policies, the developing
countries could not only contribute to their
individual and collective well-being but also to
the establishment of optimum world public order.
Tanker loading at Cook Inlet, Alaska
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Suggested further readings in this field include:
1. Rao, P. Sreenivasa, "Offshore Natural
Resources Exploitation: An Evaluation of African
Interests", 12 Indian Journal of International
Law, pp. 345-367, 1972.
2. McDougal and Burke, The Public Order of
the Oceans, Yale University Press, New Haven,
Connecticut, 1962.
3. Pinto, Christopher W., "Problems of
Developing States and Their Effects on Decisions
on Law of the Sea", in Lewis M. Alexander [Ed.],
The Law of the Sea: Needs and Interests of
Developing Countries, University of Rhode
Island, Law of the Sea Institute, February 1973,
pp. 3-13.
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Indonesia and the Philippines are pressing
for world recognition of their claims to territorial
seas measured around the entire island group
rather than around individual land masses.
Indonesia measures its territorial waters (1) as a
twelve-mile strip seaward of straight baselines (2)
connecting the outermost points of its islands. The
Philippines extends territorial jurisdiction from its
baselines to the old "Treaty Limits" line set many
years ago. Both countries regard waters landward
of the baselines as internal or national waters. The
archipelagic approach could affect a number of
straits heavily used by international shipping, such
as the Strait of Malacca (3). Note area of overlapping
jurisdiction (4).
THE ARCHIPELAGIC PRINCIPLE
Maureen KhinThitsa Franssen
Recent developments in the world have
had a profound effect on the classical law of the
sea. What we are witnessing today is the revolt of
many new countries which previously had played
little or no role in the creation and development
of that law. These nations are determined to
have a voice in the progressive development
of international rules and regulations governing
the oceans, subsoil and seabed. They are no
longer willing to step obediently into the old
clothes of an international order measured and
designed to fit the interests of Western Europe.
Existing international agreements, considered by
the major maritime powers as "traditional and
well-established rules of customary law", are
being challenged, and where no provisions
formerly existed for certain unique or peculiar
situations, fresh prescriptions governing the seas
are being put forward, espoused and actively
advocated by the new nations.
One of the most significant of these is a
concept first advanced as national positions by
the two archipelagic states of Asia Indonesia
and the Philippines in the 1950's.* The idea:
to treat islands forming an archipelago as a single
unit, with the territorial sea measured around
the islands as a group rather than around each
single island.
Provisions covering the national territory
of the Philippines (including internal waters and
territorial sea**) were laid down over a number
of decades by treaties signed by the United States,
Spain, and the United Kingdom. In 1961, Manila
formalized these provisions in an "Act to Define
the Baselines of the Territorial Sea of the
Philippines". The waters between the baselines
and the so-called "Treaty Limits of the
Philippines" (see map) are considered territorial
sea. While baseline and treaty limits virtually
coincide in the southwest, in the northeast they
are separated by approximately 285 nautical
miles of sea.
Perhaps the treaty signatories recognized
the special position of the Philippines in the law
of the sea, having been responsible for laying
down the rules and regulations for measuring its
maritime areas. Perhaps the ocean powers did not
consider the archipelago of critical strategic
importance. In any event, only one power the
Maureen Khin Thitsa Franssen is a
doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy. She has an LL.B. from King's
College, University of London.
* The first formal proposal along these
lines was in 1924 at the 33rd meeting of the
International Law Association. See Mochtar
Kusumaatmadja, "The Legal Regime of Archipelagoes:
Problems and Issues", in L.M. Alexander led.],
The Law of the Sea: Needs and Interests of
Developing Countries, Proceedings of the 7th Annual
Conference of the Law of the Sea Institute, University
of Rhode Island, June 26-29, 1972 (Kingston, Rhode
Island: U of Rhode Island, 1973), p. 166.
** There is a key distinction between
internal or national waters and the territorial sea
of a given nation. In the former, the national
government has complete authority to permit or
deny access to foreign vessels as it sees fit. In the
latter, though its waters are under the government's
jurisdiction, foreign vessels in navigation enjoy the
"right of innocent passage".
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United States reacted noticeably to the 1961
declaration that henceforth all waters around,
between, and connecting the 7,000 or so islands
were to be considered national or inland waters,
subject to exclusive Philippine sovereignty. That
reaction was limited to an ambassadorial protest.
On the other hand, Indonesia occupies
a central geographical position in Southeast Asia.
Territorially, it is the largest archipelago in the
world 3,000 islands extending as many miles
across the Indian and Pacific Oceans (see map).
Though Indonesia's claims were similar to those
of the Philippines, its position was promptly
greeted with strong criticism, chiefly from the
major maritime powers, who feared that:
1. The Indonesian claim might very
well result in the closing off of many international
straits of vital importance to their commercial
and military interests. Such an action, for
example, could force Japan to pay staggering
prices for Middle East oil, its industrial lifeblood,
due to the lengthy detour tankers would then
have to take.
2. Large areas of ocean space, customarily
used for high seas fishing and other international
activities, would be withdrawn.
3. Should the Indonesian claim be
endorsed by the world community, other small
groups of islands, in particular the Trust
Territories in the Pacific Ocean, might espouse
similar claims and seek control of ocean space
out of proportion to the actual size and
importance of these island groups. Permission
would have to be sought to enter these internal
or national waters, while some restrictions might
be placed even on innocent passage through the
vastly extended territorial sea of such archipelagic
states.
Indonesian advocacy of the archipelagic
concept came in large part as a reaction to the
method of measuring the territorial sea imposed
by the Dutch "three miles from straight lines
connecting the outermost points of the low-water
mark of the islands on the outer edge of the group
at the point where distance between these points
is not more than six miles." Even though certain
water bodies were enclosed by Dutch legislation,
Indonesia's former rulers appear to have ignored
the special nature of archipelagoes. In theory at
least, their law gave each island its own narrow
territorial sea beyond which ships of other nations
could traverse and fish at will in and out of the
island chain.
The inadequacy of the Dutch method
became fairly obvious to the Indonesians who
watched Japanese boats masquerading as innocent
fishing vessels moving close inshore to map the
islands in preparation for World War II. Upon
gaining independence in 1949, the young republic
cast about for legal models on which to base
realistic claims to surrounding waters, only to
discover there were none.
This being the case, Indonesia felt
justified in determining its own position on
the subject (while taking due account of existing
theories on international law). In 1956, a
committee was set up by the Indonesian
government to study and recommend revisions
in the existing law on territorial waters. After
considerable study and debate, on the
recommendation of this committee Djakarta
announced on December 13, 1957 that it
intended to change the maritime laws obtaining
in the Indonesian archipelago to the extent
that, in essence, "all waters surrounding, between
and connecting the islands constituting the
Indonesian state, regardless of their extensive
breadth, are integral parts of the internal or
national waters, which are under the exclusive
sovereignty of the Indonesian state." In addition,
the breadth of its territorial sea, increased to
12 nautical miles, would be measured from
straight baselines connecting the outermost
points of the islands of Indonesia.
In order to get wider world acceptance
of the archipelago concept, Indonesia decided
to bring up the matter before the Geneva
Conferences on the Law of the Sea in 1958
and 1960. However, at that time, the concept
was still too revolutionary to be accepted by
most participants. In spite of the brave efforts of
both Indonesia and the Philippines, very little
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Severe restriction of shipping in Indonesian waters
could force tankers bound from the Middle East
to Japan to take an extremely expensive detour
attention was given to it. Yet the rejection
was not complete: active support came from
unexpected quarters Yugoslavia and Denmark.
Following the Geneva Conferences,
Indonesia continued to press its case. Presented
by able and highly eloquent spokesmen, such as
Mochtar Kusumaatmadja, J. J. G. Syatauw,
Hasjim Djalal and others, the arguments for a
special archipelagic regime has found increasing
sympathy among many nations of the world.
In addition to the Philippines and Indonesia, the
following states have applied the concept of
treating the islands forming an archipelago as
a geographic unit: Ecuador (the Galapagos
Islands), Iceland, the Faroe Islands, and Fiji the
latest adherent to this concept. The people of
other island groups, such as Nauru, Tonga,
Western Samoa, the Cook Islands, and the
recently independent islands of the Bahamas
may well follow suit.
Thus, we see that what started out as
a novel Asian concept with but two adherents
has today become a reality commanding wide
support in the world community. While little
attention was given to it in earlier international
forums, it will be debated at great length at the
forthcoming third Law of the Sea Conference.
Clearly, the time has come for serious
negotiations and for accommodations that will
enable the archipelagic principle to take its place
in contemporary international law.
Margot S. Granitsas/Photo Researchers
Official Navy Photograph
Indonesians do not forget the strategic importance
of nearby waters during World War II.
For more detailed reading on this subject:
1. Djalal, Hasjim, "The Concept of Archipelago
Applied to Archipelagic States", A paper
submitted to the Working Group of the
Subcommittee on the Law of the Sea of the
Asian-African Legal Consultative Committee
(New Delhi), 1971.
2. Syatauw, J.J.G., "Indonesia and the Law of
the Sea"
,
in Some Newly Established Asian States
and the Development of International Law
(The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff), 1961.
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RESEARCH
VS
REGULATION
Herman T. Franssen
The debate over whether or not
scientific research at sea should remain free
from coastal state regulation is not conducted
in a legal or political void. It is part of the
larger problems of the division of the ocean
resources and the relationship between scientific
research and the exploitation of those resources.
These issues are presently being debated at the
Preparatory Conferences on the Law of the
Sea in Geneva and New York, where a new
Law of the Sea Conference is being prepared-
one likely to result in a new division of the
oceans. Territorial limits are not expected to
exceed 12 miles. There may be a zone of
limited national jurisdiction over resources
extending out to 200 miles from the coast.
Beyond that area, some jurisdiction over the
exploration and exploitation of resources may
be given to an International Regime. Scientific
research will almost certainly be controlled by
the coastal state within territorial limits and be
subject to some regulations in the area of limited
national jurisdiction. Oceanic research beyond
the area of limited national jurisdiction may
continue to be free from restraints.
Except for a few letters of complaint
to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic
Commission of UNESCO during the late Sixties,
little is known about the problems that ocean
scientists from countries other than the United
States encounter in their efforts to gain access
to foreign waters. However, American records
over the past ten years indicate a rapidly
deteriorating situation for the right to conduct
marine research on the continental shelves
and superjacent waters of many nations.
Whereas the Department of State reported only
six instances in which American vessels were
refused access to foreign waters from 1963
to 1966, the situation worsened considerably
during 1967-1971, when over 30 refusals were
reported.
These figures do not include numerous
lengthy administrative delays, some of which
resulted in cancellation of parts of cruises. Ship
Photo Researchers
time is usually tightly scheduled, and delays of
as little as one day can seriously interfere with
research programs and cost thousands of dollars.
A recent study by Dr. Conrad Cheek of the
Department of Defense showed 22 reported
abandonments of clearance requests that were
attributed to long delays and to discouraging
statements or actions encountered during the
clearance process. Moreover, many ocean
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Diving saucer off Baja California. Indications are that Mexico will adopt a tougher stance toward
research along its coasts. So will other Asian, African, and Latin American countries
scientists are no longer applying for access to
certain countries because of past negative
responses. The actual number of these cases
is not known.
Although instances of access restriction
and other impediments to research are fairly well
distributed around the world, Burma, Brazil, and
the Soviet Union have been most restrictive in
their attitudes toward research by other than their
own nationals. Burma has never granted access
for research purposes within its twelve-mile
Dr. Herman T. Fianssen is a Lecturer in Lav
and Organization at the Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy at Tufts College. Dr. Fianssen
has also authored, "Attitudes of Developing
Countries Towards Scientific Research at Sea,"
to be published soon.
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territorial sea, and Brazil has frequently
prohibited foreign research inside its claimed
200-mile territorial limits. However, its record
has improved somewhat in recent years. The
Soviet Union has forbidden any geological
and geophysical research on its continental
shelf, invoking a restrictive claim in a 1958
convention. However, it does allow research in
superjacent waters outside its 12-mile territorial
sea. Similarly, the Soviets do not supply the
World Data Center in Washington with
information concerning their own shelves,
though they have been fully cooperative in
exchanging data collected off the coasts of other
countries. It is possible that the recently
concluded U.S.-Soviet agreement on oceanography
will place the situation in better balance.
A small group of prominent U.S. ocean
scientists and marine lawyers impaneled by the
National Academy of Sciences, has spent years
following developments related to the conduct
of oceanic research. It is concerned that the
present restrictive practices by a relatively small
number of states will get far worse in the near
future, and recent developments indicate that
these fears are indeed well-founded. During
the past five years, several states around the
world have adopted legislation which is
expected to endanger and in some cases
seriously limit the conduct of oceanic research.
Earlier this year, when Mexico issued new
regulations on the conduct of marine research
in its coastal waters, the U.S. Department of
State warned the oceanographic community
that access to Mexican waters might well be
curtailed in the future.
On the regional level, Latin American
and Caribbean nations have concluded
agreements which refer specifically to the right
of the coastal state to regulate oceanic research
in areas of national jurisdiction. Both the 1970
Lima declaration of Latin American states and
the 1972 Santo Domingo declaration of
Caribbean countries refer to the right of the
coastal states to extend their areas of national
sovereignty unilaterally and to regulate marine
research within those areas.
The ongoing United Nations ocean
debate at the Preparatory Conferences on the
Law of the Sea, held twice a year in New
York and Geneva since 1971, has not been
promising for the ocean science community.
Developing countries in particular have
indicated that they favor coastal state controls
over scientific research, not only in the
territorial sea, but also within the area of
limited national jurisdiction which, when
negotiations are completed, may well extend
out to 200 miles from the coast. As 96 of the
132 members of the United Nations consider
themselves developing countries, their positions
on scientific research will determine to a large
extent the outcome of the Law of the Sea
Conference for ocean science.
On the basis of a detailed questionnaire
sent to most American oceanographers, the
Defense Department recently discovered that
50% of all research conducted takes place on
and above the continental shelf, 30% beyond
the continental shelf but landward of 200 miles,
and 20% beyond 200 miles. Thus, if the
countries participating in the Law of the Sea
Conference agree on the right of coastal states
to regulate oceanic research in the area beyond
a narrow territorial sea of twelve miles, about
80% of all oceanic research will be affected.
That is not to say that all countries would
exercise these rights to the fullest extent, but
it does mean that most scientists would be
affected in some way or another by restrictive
regulations. If past experiences are any guideline
for the future, we may expect that research
related to ocean resources, such as biological
research concerning fisheries and geological and
geophysical surveys on the continental shelf,
will be subject to more stringent regulations
than research that is only distantly related to
resources.
Among the more important reasons for
the growing restraints on marine research in
claimed coastal waters are:
'The fear of espionage and other
subversive activities of the state conducting
the research. ['Project Camelot', a plan to
study subversive activities in Latin American
countries during the mid-Sixties, damaged the
relationship between bona fide scientific
institutions in the U.S. and Latin America
for some time. Only a few years after the
'Camelot' incident, the captain of the Pueblo
told his North Korean captors that his ship
was undertaking scientific research when
intercepted. Although the marine science
community was not involved in any subversive
activities, the credibility of the American
scientific community as a whole was tarnished
by the actions of others.]
'The increase in the number of newly
independent nations and the rapid growth of
oceanic research activities in distant waters.
Many developing countries lack the expertise
to evalue each project on its merits, and
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there is a tendency among bureaucracies to
shelve research requests if there is any doubt
about the nature of the project.
'The desire of developing countries
to regulate scientific research in coastal waters
as part of a deliberate attempt to narrow the
growing technological gap between themselves
and the industrialized world. If oceanic research
beyond a narrow territorial sea of twelve miles
were to remain free, coastal states would not be
in a position to require a quid pro quo. Once
they control access for scientific research in the
proposed area of limited national jurisdiction,
they can attempt to extract a price in return
for that access. The price, as expressed by
various spokesmen for developing countries,
will be in the form of technical assistance to
help the technological "have-nots" acquire a
capability to participate in a meaningful way in
the exploration and exploitation of ocean
resources. Moreover, some degree of scientific
and technological independence is considered a
prerequisite for true political independence.
*The recurrent fears developing
countries have of being exploited again by the
advanced maritime powers. While scientists
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from the developed countries are primarily
interested in undertaking research in order to
learn more about the ocean environment, general
productivity, the origin of the world, and
related matters, developing countries maintain
that the acquired knowledge can be utilized by
the industrialized countries. As a Brazilian
diplomat put it recently: "In the last analysis,
every particle of scientific knowledge can be
translated into terms of economic gain or
national security, and in technological society
scientific knowledge means power".
As most developing countries are not
able to analyze the data collected by scientists
from advanced countries, they are reluctant to
provide automatic access to their claimed
coastal waters for foreign research parties, even
if the latter provide them with copies of all data
and pledge that the results will be published
in scientific journals. Developing countries
are primarily interested in the exploitation
of resources. They wish to control oceanic
research, which they regard as the first step
toward exploitation. Therefore, the least they
demand is some form of control to guarantee that
research undertaken in their claimed coastal
waters is of a scientific nature that it will not
impair national security nor give the
developed countries additional advantage in the
exploitation of resources.
Maritime nations with an ocean science
capability of their own have defended the
position that basic research at sea is conducted
to improve man's understanding of the ocean
environment. Their scientists have pointed out
that the very nature of the ocean and the
migratory patterns of much of its living resources,
require a global research approach. To a
scientist it makes little sense to stop conducting
research beyond an artificial man-made border.
He knows that artificial boundaries will not
only affect his own research but will eventually
impair proper management of resources and
control of pollution.
Freedom for scientific research at sea
is only one of the many issues to be discussed
at the Law of the Sea Conference. Its ultimate
defense will depend to a large extent on its
importance vis a vis the interests of national
security, shipping, the oil and mineral industry,
and both the coastal and long-distant fishing
interests. While most maritime countries
basically support the concept of freedom of
scientific investigation, few developed nations
with the exception of the U.S., USSR, Japan,
and the United Kingdom and possibly a few
more are expected to put up a fight in defense
of research at sea.
The very concept of freedom of
scientific research, a corrollary of the ancient
doctrine of freedom of the seas, is under serious
attack by a growing number of developing
coastal states. It is expected that the days of
easy, unregulated access to foreign coastal
waters are numbered. At the time of this
writing, there is a distinct possibility that
coastal states will receive some regulatory
power over marine research in the area of
limited national jurisdiction. However, it is
still possible that the major maritime powers
will succeed in minimizing national regulation
of oceanic research in return for improved
international cooperation in marine science
activities and expanded technical assistance to
enhance the marine science capability of the
developing countries.
The United States, through one of its
representatives in the U.N. Seabed Committee,
Ambassador Donald McKernan, has agreed in
principle to commit funds to support multilateral
efforts aimed at creating and enlarging the
ability of developing states to interpret and use
scientific data for their economic benefit and
other purposes and to augment their expertise
in the field of marine science research. Scientific
equipment will also be made available, along
with instruction in its use and maintenance.
The State Department has not yet added
significantly to Mr. McKernan's statement, nor
have developing countries countered with
concrete proposals of their own.
Whatever the outcome of the pending
Law of the Sea Conference, access to Latin
American, Asian, and African waters will
probably become costlier and generally more
difficult to obtain. However, skillful scientists
at a few ocean science institutions have already
entered into bilateral and regional agreements
with other governments for specific research
programs. While by no means an ideal solution,
such agreements provide scientists with
alternatives in case coastal states receive
complete or limited jurisdiction over scientific
research beyond narrow territorial limits.
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Free-fall electromagnetic current meter used
to examine the depth dependence of the water
velocity of currents. Many developing countries
are concerned that complexity of advanced marine
research will prevent them from benefiting from
findings, even if they are given all data.
Tom Sanford
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Most marine boundary disputes that
have been in the news recently involv^
disagreements between coastal nations and
wide'-ranging fishing fleets from other 'countsitfs
the British trawlers^pff Ice^nd, American"
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f!i|J>eimen here bear for the large and efficient
trawler fleets from Poland, West Germany, and
Drilling rigs may eventually come to Georges Bank,
but not before proprietary as well as environmental
issues are resolved.
the Soviet Union that are seriously overfishing
the stocks on Ceorges Bank. (See Oceanus,
Spring 1973.) The Commonwealth of
,
Massachusetts has unilaterally proclaimed
a 200-mile seaward boundary in what is to
'date an ineffectual attempt to protect her
fishing .industry.
T^Ae are disputes over the ownership
of marine resources in the water. In the case of
"r
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00(3 square miles (2,000 more than that
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^X; .uf. 'William Ahem, Jr. received his degree
from the Kennedy School of Government at
Harvard University and is now with RAND
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of Massachusetts), starts about 70 miles southeast
of Cape Cod and extends 200 miles out to the
edge of the continental shelf. Oil and gas in
producible quantities may exist under the outer
half of the Bank, where sediments are thick.
Drillers off Nova Scotia in Canadian waters, in
sediments similar to those under Georges Bank,
have come up with small producible finds of gas
and low-boiling-point oil. Oil companies have
been pressing the Interior Department for leases
on Georges Bank since the early 1960's.
Exploration with the latest seismic, gravity, and
magnetic equipment has been conducted over
the entire Bank. The oil company data are
proprietary, but the interest in leases indicates
that the companies have found some favorable
looking structures. Tracts on Georges Bank
cannot be legally leased for exploratory drilling,
however, until title to the submerged lands and
the resources beneath them is settled. To
understand the problem, and to put it in
perspective, a brief look at the past is in order.
Nobody really cared who owned the
United States continental shelf until the late
1940's, when drilling for oil moved into the
Gulf of Mexico from onshore fields. It was
obvious to Louisiana state officials, President
Truman, and many Congressmen that selling
leases and collecting royalties on offshore
production would bring in millions in revenue
to the government with jurisdiction over the
shelf's resources. Truman felt it should all go
to the federal government, but his bills were
blocked in Congress. President Eisenhower was
more favorably inclined toward the states. With
his backing, Congress passed the Submerged
Lands Act in 1953. This gave the coastal states
jurisdiction over the seabed out to their
"historical boundaries". The rest, termed the
Outer Continental Shelf (OCS), came under
federal jurisdiction. This Act avoided the
ownership issue, giving the headache of
determining historical boundaries to the
Supreme Court. A sister act, the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953, then
gave the Secretary of the Interior the power
to administer the OCS, to sell mineral leases on
it, and to collect royalties from production.
To no one's surprise, the boundary issue
soon .came before the Supreme Court. Louisiana,
Texas, Alabama, Mississippi, and Florida claimed
boundaries of three leagues (10.5 miles) from
their shores. The burden of proof was on the
states to show they warranted more than the
traditional three-mile limit. Not until 1960 did
the Supreme Court resolve this question.
Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama, it
decided, were entitled to no more than three
miles from their coastlines. Texas was granted
its claim to three leagues because that was the
seaward boundary of the Republic of Texas
Larger than Massachusetts, Georges Bank lies
70 miles off Cape Cod
when it was annexed to the Union in 1845.
Florida's Gulf of Mexico boundary was also
recognized as three leagues because it was
accepted by Congress in Florida's new
constitution when that state was readmitted
into the Union after the Civil War.
The dispute with Louisiana, however,
went further than the three-league three-mile
controversy. Judge Leander Perez, district attorney
and undisputed boss of Plaquemines Parish and
a power in the state, wanted the offshore oil
revenues for local use. The state boldly claimed
that its coastline coincided with the line
established by the Coast Guard to define the
limits of inland waters for navigational purposes.
This "Coast Guard Line" was, in some places,
forty miles seaward of the physical coastline.
With this claim Louisiana won an injunction
from the Supreme Court in 1956 halting Interior
Department leasing in the disputed area. The
resulting unemployment and the ire of the oil
companies moved the state and Interior to enter
into an agreement to conduct joint lease sales
and to hold the revenues in escrow pending
settlement of the case.
With its drawn-out proceedings, the
Supreme Court took thirteen years, until 1969,
to deny Louisiana's claim that the "Coast Guard
Line" was to be used for determining its grant
under the Submerged Lands Act. This released
more than one billion dollars to the U.S.
Treasury. Questions relating to the precise
location of the geographical coast of Louisiana
are still being considered by a special master of
the Court twenty years after passage of the
Submerged Lands Act.
California also entered court with the
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federal government over claims to the oil-rich
Santa Barbara Channel. The state claimed all
the areas inside its offshore islands, some of
which are fifty miles from land. In 1965 the
Supreme Court, adopting definitions formulated
at the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of
the Sea, limited California's seabed jurisdiction
to three miles from shore and to three miles
around the islands. This cleared the way for
federal lease sales in the Channel.
Alaska has also attempted to extend its
control more than three miles seaward. The state
claims that all of Cook Inlet is an historic inland
sea and should come under Alaskan jurisdiction.
That case is still pending.
Boundary disputes between the coastal
states and the federal government clearly are
nothing new. The states, quite naturally, attempt
to get a share of the revenues once they learn oil
and gas may be present off their shores. But
state claims beyond three miles have a poor
success record in the Supreme Court.
The State of Maine initiated the
federal-state dispute over the continental shelf
off the East Coast. In 1969 Maine sold petroleum
exploration leases to King Resources, a private
development firm, for an area more than 100
miles from the Maine Coast. The Justice
Department, on information from Interior,
brought suit against Maine to halt such leasing
beyond the three-mile boundary. Massachusetts
joined Maine as a defendant in the suit. Their
case rests on a claim that a 200-mile jurisdiction
was granted in their 17th-century colonial
charter. (Maine was a part of the Massachusetts
Bay Colony at the time.) Eleven other Atlantic
Coast states, claiming more than three-mile
boundaries, have joined Maine and
Portland
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Massachusetts, so that the case now concerns
thirteen state-federal OCS boundaries. In 1970
the Supreme Court appointed a special master,
the Chief Judge of the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals in Philadelphia, to hear testimony from
all sides and to make recommendations prior to
the Court's considering the case. He has said he
will make his report no earlier than 1974. If any
of the parties disagrees with his recommendations,
the boundary issue could be before the Supreme
Court for a number of years.
While this case, U.S. vs. Maine et al,
Original, 1969, is pending, the Interior
Department cannot lease tracts in the disputed
area unless an agreement is made with the states
involved in the case of Georges Bank, with
Massachusetts. An arrangement could be made
to hold any leasing and other revenues in escrow
and to hold joint lease sales. This would be
unlikely, since one of the motives of
Massachusetts officials seems to be to delay
any such lease sales. The strength of the
environmental groups and fishing interests in
the state makes such a stand a popular one.
Canada also disputes federal claims to
the Georges Bank seabed. The Ottawa
government claims about one-third of the Bank,
the eastern third, under the 1958 Law of the
Sea Convention, which provided a formula for
delineating international boundaries. Since 1965
the Canadian Department of External Affairs has
granted geological exploration permits, which
do not allow drilling, for that part of the Bank.
Washington challenged the validity of these
permits in 1969, and the two countries held two
rounds of inconclusive talks in 1970. The
international boundary issue may be resolved at
the 1974 International Law of the Sea Conference.
Georges Bank is clearly an extension of
the U.S. continental shelf. It is separated
from the Canadian Scotian Shelf by the
Northeast Channel, which is more than 200
meters deep (see map). But a line drawn
from the Maine-New Brunswick border through
a point equidistant from Cape Cod and Nova
Scotia puts one-third of the Bank on the
Canadian side. Until the international seabed
boundary is settled, any leasing by Interior or by
Massachusetts would be protested by Ottawa.
Due to these legal tangles nobody will
have the clear right to make a decision whether
or not to lease Georges Bank for petroleum
development for at least one year and, perhaps,
for ten years or more. If the special master
recommends against the East Coast states, they
are likely to prolong the court struggle. As long
as there is a small chance a coastal state might
get control over the resources under the adjacent
seabed, there is likely to be a boundary dispute
between that state and the federal government
pending before the Supreme Court.
Jeff Zwinakis
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Scattered along the northeast Brazilian
coast, many small fishing communities exist in a
limbo somewhere between colonial and modern
society. It is easy to treat the continuity of
traditional fishing as a mere ethnographic
curiosity. Many tourists who have visited fishing
villages no doubt remember them as being full
of happy peasants enjoying the good simple life.
Admittedly, the natural beauty of some village
settings helps to produce this kind of tropical
beach fantasy. However, a less excusable set of
myths consistently appears in the work of a
group of economic specialists who have made
fisheries development their primary concern.
Their discipline is grounded on an a priori
commitment to change, largely in the form of
technical innovation. The justification for this
approach is the familiar argument that because
of competition with more advanced technologies,
the disappearance of traditional fishing is a
foregone conclusion.
The trouble with this let's-help-
modernization-along philosophy is that it
stresses efficiency in production alone as a
criterion for group survival, thereby ignoring the
complexities of the cultural context in which
traditional fishermen work. In fact, if productive
efficiency were as critical as some economists
would have us believe, especially in an
economically booming country like Brazil
with no large indigenous population to
assimilate, we might reasonably ask: why haven't
traditional fishing communities vanished already?
As in other economically downtrodden
areas of the world, small-scale coastal fisheries
in northeast Brazil continue to exist for at least
two obvious reasons. First, many traditional
communities have evolved over a long period
of time into finely balanced cultural-ecological
systems so that population is allowed to expand
at resource harvest rates compatible with
continuing resource availability in fixed locations.
Second, labor-intensive traditional fishing is
usually adaptive to local economic realities
that is, as an alternative source of cash and food
in job-scarce areas.
For these reasons, often not fully
appreciated by fisheries planners, traditional
fishing society may be a long time passing.
Paradoxically, in certain instances, this process
may take even longer than if government
agencies did not try to accelerate change through
technical innovation. Simple illustrations of the
pitfalls of fisheries modernization in a traditional
setting not given a proper advance survey by
administrators can be found in the fishing
neighborhoods of a Brazilian coastal town of
about 25,000 people situated in the State of
Bahia at the head of a large estuary (see map).
The town is surrounded by extensive mangrove
swamps where fishermen make their homes.
They use canoes to fish the swamp waterways
for what amounts to a subsistence living.
Canoe fishing is perhaps the oldest
fishing pattern on the Brazilian coast and is
marked by a blend of indigenous, Portuguese,
and African traditions. Prior to innovation, the
durability of this tradition could be attributed
to an elaborate system of territorial rights, which
effectively prevented fishermen from competing
for the same prime water spaces within the
estuary. Property claims and the limited number
Dr. John C. Cordell received his degree
in anthropology from. Stanford University. He
spent two years in Brazil conducting the
research on which this article is based.
Swamp fishermen of this article live south of
Salvador, capital of Bahia state
Catherine Nigh
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of fishing apprenticeship opportunities controlled
by boat captains also helped to regulate fishing
pressure. Territoriality, in fact the timing of all
fishing operations, was encoded in a lunar
calendar. This calendar was observed by all
traditional fishermen and aided them in
processing and sorting information. As a
culturally shared, four-dimensional mental map
of the fishing grounds, it synchronized boat
movements, the choice of fishing methods, and
the availability of fishing spots according to
bi-weekly and daily tide fluctuations.
The cumulative effect of these linked
regulatory mechanisms was to stabilize the
fishing community as a whole in an adaptive
economic routine. Although the community
was in theory using a common property fishery,
competition was never a problem since the entire
man-environment system was reinforced by a
cooperative ethic that places a high value on
mutual trust and respect.
Yet the purely formal elegance and
complexity of canoe fishing is in sharp contrast
to the poverty in the swamp neighborhoods
where research was carried out in 1970. Families
seem to get enough to eat by hunting crabs and
shellfish, but they remain extremely poor, even
by lower-class Brazilian standards. Many houses
are at best only temporary shelters of sticks and
palm fronds which have to be abandoned during
the rainy season, when they are inundated by
the tides. In this light the sophisticated system
of social organization and natural history lore
underlying traditional canoe fishing holds little
economic potential. Its usefulness seems instead
to belong to some earlier, more favorable
life-style.
It is relatively pointless to study the
fishermen's present adaptation to the swamp
without asking a fundamental question about
their economic welfare: given the inhospitable
nature and limited resources in this type of
environment, what are several thousand people
doing there? By tradition, the fishing population
did not consist of crab scavangers but rather
of net fishermen, and the waters they worked
were not those of the mangrove swamp but the
local estuary and ocean beaches. Accordingly,
the fishing economy did not always operate as
it does today at a household subsistence level.
Although canoe fishing had its colonial origins
in family-oriented subsistence production carried
on by escaped slaves, it gradually became
involved in the economic expansion of local
towns and eventually entered a highly active
commercial phase starting around 1910 and
lasting for thirty or forty years. Large quantities
of marine catfish, mullet, snook, and shark were
caught and sold on the market. Then, not long
ago, people turned to the swamp, again for a
subsistence living, and the fishing system
completed a full development cycle. Most older
fishermen, in fact, had witnessed these two
distinct phases in fishing specialization during
their lifetimes.
It is not necessary to go back very far
in local economic history to find that trouble
began in fishing soon after the state fisheries
agency introduced nylon nets to the area. This
took place about 15 years ago, as part of a
modernization program to increase productivity
of inshore net fishing in the northeast. Like other
development fantasies of its era/ this project
looked good on paper to fisheries managers in
Rio, but was totally unsuited to local conditions.
In Bahia, at least, the fisheries
improvement program was doomed to failure
because of its single-minded emphasis on gear
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efficiency. No one bothered to ask how the
traditional fishing system worked in its estuarine
environment, how production was organized in
local communities, or what impact intensified
fishing would have on marine resources. It is no
surprise, then, that the modernization attempt
ultimately proved incompatible with the
expansion possibilities of net fishing. The main
problem was purely mechanical, having to do
with the fixed-territorial aspect of the fishing
grounds. Canoes, without being motorized, could
not venture out beyond the estuaries. Not only
this, but the tides acted to restrict fishing greatly
in terms of the number of suitable locations for
nets (including the new nylon equipment) each
day. In the long run, too many nylon nets were
added, and too few water spaces were available
to accommodate them in the local estuary.
Worse still in the context of these
unrecognized range limitations was the mistake
fishery planners made in their method of
introducing the new nets. They were originally
intended for purchase by traditional fishing
captains. Yet nearly all of these fishermen
rejected the innovation, not out of any inherent
conservatism but because they could not meet
the loan repayment schedules. Consequently the
nylon nets fell into the hands of wealthy
middlemen (factory bosses, plantation owners,
and local merchants) who could afford to
speculate in fishing. Numerous fishermen were
already indebted to these entrepreneurs and so
were drawn into an easily exploitable pool of
cheap labor.
Over the next few years a highly
competitive nylon-net fishing enclave grew up
in the midst of the traditional community. In
the ensuing struggle for control of the fishing
grounds, the previous natural balance between
production units and fishing territories was
shattered. A tremendous amount of cut-throat
competition was generated, much equipment
At times, traditional fishermen leave the estuary to fish the surf John C. Cordell
was destroyed and some fishermen were killed.
The intensification of fishing also severely
depleted some native fish stocks, such as catfish,
shrimp and flounder. Economic warfare crippled
the industry in general, and members of the
traditional community in particular.
Pressured by the effects of overfishing,
traditional captains were increasingly lured into
high-risk strategies with their equipment against
the better financed nylon-net specialists. These
contests ended frequently in "zero-sum" games.
Traditional fishermen, most of whom did not
have sufficient capital to continue these games,
were eventually forced to shift their base of
operations to the mangrove swamp itself. They
could do little to alter this situation without
being organized into a fishing guild that might
have provided some legal and political leverage.
On the other hand, military police were often
hired by the nylon-net entrepreneurs to harass
the traditional neighborhoods. On several
occasions nets were burned and fish confiscated.
Socially and ecologically, then, the
history of canoe fishing illustrates how the
traditional population was competitively excluded
from the relatively superior niche it once utilized
(the estuary) and forced to colonize an inferior
niche (the swamp). Moreover, contrary to an
assumption underlying much fisheries policy, this
Brazilian coastal enterprise in practice never had
the status of a common property resource.
Neither entry nor movement of production units
was free, but always under the monopolistic sway
of one or another power base which was able to
act as if the fishery were its own exclusive
domain. In the absence of formal legal sanctions,
cut-throat competition simply represents the
means taken by outside economic interests to
evict the traditional community from its
customary private fishing reserve. Competition
of this nature seems to be endemic and
ubiquitous in a developing society like Brazil.
But it is at society's lowest levels that people
can least afford the consequences.
What can the traditional fishermen do
to regain a mobility foothold in the larger
society? The prospects are indeed bleak. For one
thing, it is difficult to re-channel specialized
fishing knowledge or labor to other occupations.
Even if this were possible, jobs would be
exceedingly hard for fishermen to find in this
part of Brazil. Local plantations have been
sloughing off workers for years and with the high
rate of rural-urban migration, there is a surplus
of cheap labor around the town. The point is
that many lower-class workers would never have
turned to subsistence fishing for a living in the
first place if it had not been as a last economic
resort.
Job scarcity thus has left traditional net
-ii.5
w
>'
-
fishermen with really only one option to move
out to the swamp and fish there, however they
can. The swamp will not support them
indefinitely, though. Its resources have already
begun to be depleted under the pressure of a
growing sedentary population. Shellfish collecting
range limitations may be clearly seen in the
activities of people who have lived in the swamp
for only five years. As their neighborhoods
expand, they must go farther and farther away
from home base to achieve a desirable
work-production ratio. This means that the
farther out in the swamp people are forced to
settle, the more remote they become from the
town, which is really their only point of contact
with the rest of society.
The predicament of swamp fishermen
therefore raises some basic questions about
directing change in traditional fisheries. First,
what does the structure of traditional fishing
offer as a foundation for fisheries development?
Second, is it worthwhile to introduce technical
assistance without simultaneously altering the
production and marketing systems in question?
Third, if gradual change in local fishing is in
fact a practical strategy for planners, are there
alternatives to investment solely in technical aid
which would act equally well as incentives to
increase production? Fourth, what are the real
output capabilities of most peasant fishing
industries that is, considering our responsibility
to help preserve both the cultural and natural
resources of the communities involved? These
questions should serve as a cautionary note to
development agencies concerned with fisheries.
Surely it would not seem wise to encourage
either the adoption of a superior and possibly
over-efficient catching system, or the addition
of production units of any kind in a
fixed-territorial fishery before its expansion
possibilities, if any, can be realistically evaluated.
Finally, I would not want to claim that
the history of swamp fishermen represents a
social trend for all such communities or fisheries
projects. However, we should not delude
ourselves about the miracles technology can
work in primitive settings. Since modernization
is a socially selective process, the question
remains: who benefits from it, and at whose
expense? In a highly stratified society like
Northeast Brazil, the answer to this question is a
foregone conclusion, since part of the cost of
technological change is the maintenance of
social inequality.
Other books relating to this article include:
1. Forman, Shepard, The Raft Fisherman,
Indiana University Press, 1970.
2. Furtado, Celso, Obstacles to Development in
Latin America, Anchor Books, New York, 1970.
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"There be three things which are too
wonderful for me, yea, four which I know not:
The way of an eagle in the air ; the way of a
serpent upon a rock; the way of a ship in the
midst of the sea
;
and the way of a man with
a maid." (Proverbs 30:18-19.)
The way of a ship . . . the Institution's
Atlantis II, Voyage #75, Leg #7, Las Palmas
in the Canaries to Lisbon. There is the routine,
the hard work, the horsing around. And there is
the wonderment, a touch of it, in the midst of
the sea. Pictures by Frank Medeiros, head of the
Institution's Photo Lab.
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Window-choppers in Woods Hole will recognize
the style of the print above. The artist is
Joan Kanwisher, wife of Dr. John Kanwisher of
the Institution's Department of Biology.
The print at left! The style is different, but the
name is the same. Susan Kanwisher's talent
is her own, but the inspiration is at least
partly familial.
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